

Comments on Bendix Test
Outlines for Inspection of
Declared and Undeclared
Missile Production Facilities
and Transportation Monitoring

Inspection of Declared Facilities (BSR 812)

The test objectives and the methodology are reasonable. The choice of facilities could be altered in order to 1) better reflect flow pattern in rocket engine production as distinct from production concurrent with R&D work, 2) include a facility involved in both ICBM and space booster production and 3) include something closer to actual production of solid missiles--i.e. inspection of facilities engaged in fabricating motor casings, and the filling and curing process. Accordingly, the following facilities should be considered as additions or alternatives for the list on page 29.

- 1) Rocketdyne Facility, Neosho, Mo.
- 2) Convair Plant, San Diego, Calif.
- 3) Hercules Plant, Magna, Utah or Air Force Plant #66 (Rocketdyne) Macgregor, Texas

As a condition for assuring production at agreed rates, it is suggested that more attention be paid to the feasibility of limiting the area of a declared facility to a size commensurate with agreed production rates. For example, it is possible to establish the amount of floorspace required for a given rate of missile production at assumed levels of subcontracting, flow rates, work hours and missile weights, and it is thus feasible to limit the size of a declared facility as a supplementary means of control.

Inspection of Undeclared Facilities (BSR 743)

The assumption in this study is that inspection of a facility for the existence of a specialized component or sub-assembly is the best way to determine whether or not an undeclared facility is actually engaged in supporting clandestine assembly of missiles. Rather than emphasizing products, which at low production rates could be quickly hidden, it is suggested that there are probably

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unique production processes or features that are more likely indicators of missile-related activity. Therefore, in addition to the proposed test objectives, the search teams might be asked

- 1) to report on specialized equipment, tools and jigs that are idle or in use, which are compatible with missile related production
- 2) to search for indications of special areas within the plant for metal treatment, environmentally - controlled rooms, or particularly meticulous quality control procedures and
- 3) to observe use of material or parts with unusually critical specifications for the type of declared projects involved -- e.g. the use of expensive alloy steels in production of refrigerators which was observed in the analysis of the Dnepr refrigerator produced at DMDPC. This approach is particularly applicable to parts for electronic products.

As a general comment to this study, it would seem more efficient -- under actual conditions -- that inspection of undeclared facilities be implemented by the same inspectors as monitor declared facilities. Therefore, it is suggested that at least one field test be given to testing the relative accuracy obtained by using the same inspectors for both declared and undeclared facilities.

Transportation Monitoring (BSR 827)

The test conditions for Phase I appear to be reasonably valid. The personnel fatigue factor would appear to be the most important consideration to test, and also the ability of the observers to distinguish between, say, an 80-foot passenger car and a 90-foot passenger car. It is assumed that Phase IV will deal with possible movement of missiles by truck from the urban areas for transshipment to rail cars at a point beyond the monitoring stations. In this regard, there are various combinations of road, rail and water shipments that could be devised to by-pass a rail monitoring system. Finally, distinction of critical areas by population is not a valid criterion, as it removed at least one known missile production area from the monitoring list.

As a general comment to the transportation study, the test procedures and parameters for the Phase III tests (air transportation) are not clear. Although it is agreed that no Soviet operational aircraft can carry strategic missiles, such aircraft may be expected should the Soviets feel a need to circumvent an agreement. It is unclear how this sort of traffic could be monitored without compromising certain intelligence collection and analytic techniques.

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